The site of a rice farm plagued by drought in the Volta Region.
The Ghana Rice Inter-Professional Body (GRIB) has revealed that rice production in the Volta Region of Ghana faces bleak consequences this year due to ongoing drought conditions which are disrupting production in some parts of the Region.
According to the body, farmers in the Akatsi North and South districts in the Volta Region have been gravely affected by poor rainfall patterns and are likely to lose their entire output for the 2021/2022 season.
“In Ketu South alone, over 700 hectares of rice have been lost to the drought. “The problem covers several areas including Kpoglu, Avalavi, Klenomadi and Avie in Ketu North, Akatsi in Akatsi South, Tongu Districts, Afadzato South District and Hohoe Municipal areas,” the President said.
This comes as a blow to the sector, which is an attempt to wean the country off rice importation by achieving self-sufficiency in production by 2025.
As if that is not enough, the affected farmers will have to wait till next year before they can earn some income.
Speaking to the reporter, President of GRIB Nana Agyei Ayeh II said some members of the farmers reached out to him to ascertain the situation and find a solution to the looming danger.
The President, together with some of the officials of the John A. Kufuor Foundation paid a working visit to the farms, and on their observation, several hectares of rice under cultivation are lost due to climate change and low levels of rainfall in these communities.
The woes of the farmers are further exacerbated by the huge investments they have already made in land preparation, seeds, and fertilizer.
However, the provisional production figures by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) indicate that about 973, 000 metric tonnes of rice were produced in Ghana in 2020. But, this figure could be hard to match in 2021 if the current situation persists.
Nana Agyei Ayeh II revealed that the existing dam structure which was built to harvest water to irrigate the farmlands is in a dire state of disrepair, leaving farmers at the mercy of the harsh weather conditions.
“We cannot continue with rain-fed agriculture. As you can see, this year, farmers have lost their investments simply because the rains failed them.
We would like to appeal to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to provide dugouts for these areas. These will aid in water conservations for the purposes of irrigation in such times like what we facing now” he added.
Thousands of cassava farmers in Oti Region are facing crisis as their processed cassava chips have piled up with no buyers, causing significant financial losses.
The chips processed with peels intact, are now deemed unsuitable for cassava flour production, exacerbating the issue.
A visit by the Ghana News Agency (GNA), to some communities sighted some sacks of cassava chips lined up under mango trees and heaped by the roadsides gathering dust highlighting the plight of farmers.
Madam Comfort Babijome, a farmer at Gyato Chayo, a farming community in Krachi Nchumuru District, revealed that, a bag of cassava chips was now selling for less than GH¢100, a stark contrast to the GH¢350-400 a year ago.
Kasim Kwame Abubakar, a cassava farmer from the Sibi community in the Nkwanta North District, is pleading for government support as his processed cassava chips are going to waste.
Abubakar’s story is not different from farmers in Krachi East, who are struggling to find buyers. “We need the government to help us find markets or provide alternative solutions.”
Everywhere you look, “food systems transformation” is the new buzzword. From U.N. conferences to corporate boardrooms, the term is gaining momentum. But behind the headlines, real change remains elusive.
At last summer’s U.N. Food Systems Summit Stocktake in Addis Ababa, world leaders gathered to review progress. But for many, the event also exposed deep tensions.
The Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism (CSIPM) – a global coalition representing hundreds of grassroots organisations within the U.N. Committee on World Food Security – withdrew from the process, citing concerns that corporate interests were being prioritised over the rights and realities of local communities.
This wasn’t just a political disagreement. It revealed something more fundamental: our food systems agenda is still anchored in an illusion of control, the belief that transformation can be centrally designed, measured and managed.
The systems we work within are increasingly complex, unpredictable and non-linear.
Development finance is retreating or being restructured as governments pivot toward defence and national security spending. Meanwhile, climate shocks are accelerating – Europe alone now loses 28 billion euros annually in agricultural damages, a figure expected to rise to 40 billion euros by 2050. These aren’t outliers; they are the new normal.
And yet, we continue to build planning frameworks, log frames and toolkits that assume change is linear and measurable.
Too often, what’s labelled as “learning” is an exercise of ticking boxes, not asking what’s working or why. Most monitoring and measurement systems reward the reporting of progress indicators, not serious reflection about efficiency, process or weaknesses in implementation.
For generations, farmers, pastoralists and local producers have been navigating uncertainty, not in theory, but in practice. Kenyan herders, for example, navigate volatile rainfall, shifting prices, pest outbreaks and political instability. In response, they’ve developed adaptive strategies: splitting herds, negotiating land access and diversifying crops and incomes. These are not nostalgic traditions; they are active, context-aware systems built for resilience
Yet, too often, this knowledge is ignored or overwritten by externally defined solutions. Localisation is high on the global agenda, but a recent FAO review of national food systems pathways reveals that sub-national actors remain under-resourced, under-represented and structurally disconnected from the planning and budgeting processes that shape their futures.
The good news? A different kind of transformation is already under way, in quiet corners, led by those who don’t ask for permission.
In Brazil, Uganda, and India, farmers are organising participatory guarantee systems, trust-based alternatives to expensive organic certification. Built on social networks and peer review, these systems are more than cost-effective. In Brazil, they’re recognised by law. More importantly, they restore agency and control to producers themselves.
In Ethiopia, the Bank of Oromia is trialling revenue-based loans, a new model that doesn’t require fixed monthly repayments or traditional collateral. Instead, repayment is tied to income, giving borrowers, especially agri-entrepreneurs, room to absorb shocks. This innovation reflects a more grounded understanding of agricultural risk and rural cash flow.
In Mali, the Regreening Africa programme convened joint reflection missions that brought together women’s groups, traditional leaders and officials to review evidence on land degradation. Equipped with new tools, 30 women’s associations successfully advocated for land rights. In a country where women rarely hold legal titles, these associations now own agroforestry plots, growing food trees such as shea, parkia, and moringa.
Even within the U.N. system, its Forest and Farm Facility provides flexible funding that allows producer organisations to set their own goals and define success in their own terms. It shifts power, quietly but deliberately, from compliance to agency.
Some funders are shifting the way they work. The philanthropic collective Co-Impact, supports long-term, locally led systems change without rigid targets. Its Gender Fund centres women leaders and grassroots organisations in defining outcomes, not just delivering pre-set ones.
None of these examples are perfect. But they share a common thread: they don’t start with control. They start with trust, local leadership and a commitment to learn in the face of complexity.
Global and national actors must shift from directing change to enabling it; from defining outcomes to facilitating learning, coordination and long-term support.
It requires investing in feedback loops and flexible funding mechanisms that allow for iteration, failure and adaptation. In a paper we developed with colleagues last year, we offer a practical framework for how this can happen.
In short, we don’t need more control. We just need the courage to learn, to listen, and to let go.
The Ghana National Cocoa Farmers Association (GNACOFA) is warning of a nationwide demonstration if the government fails to address their pressing concerns.
The association is demanding urgent reforms to improve the welfare and safety of cocoa farmers, including the introduction of a pension scheme, improved health insurance, and quality healthcare.
“Cocoa farmers currently don’t have adequate social protection,” said Mr. Stephenson Anane Boateng, National President of GNACOFA.
“We are calling on the government to establish a pension scheme, expand and strengthen health insurance coverage, and provide quality healthcare for cocoa farmers.”
Speaking to OTEC news on Wednesday January 14, 2025, Mr Boateng also expressed concern over the struggles cocoa farmers face in receiving payment after selling their beans to buyers.
“It’s unacceptable that farmers struggle to get paid,” he said.
The government has been urged to act on these demands to avoid a massive nationwide demonstration.
A pension scheme for cocoa farmers has been in discussion for years, with COCOBOD launching a pilot program in three districts in 2024.
Professor Roger Kanton, agricultural research scientist has stated that President John Dramani Mahama’s commitments to the agricultural sector are largely on track, based on actions taken within the first year of his second administration.
He said this at a roundtable discussion organised by Channel One TV on the topic John Mahama 2.0: A Thematic Assessment of Year One on Tuesday, January 13, 2026, Professor Kanton said an assessment of the President’s promises against implementation so far shows encouraging progress.
“When you take what the President said he will do and what he has done so far, I think, so far so good,” he said.
Professor Kanton highlighted the introduction of flagship programmes such as Feed Ghana and the 24-Hour Economy as evidence of the government’s commitment to transforming the agricultural sector.
He noted that these initiatives align with the four key agricultural priorities outlined by the President during the campaign, adding that implementation has either begun or advanced significantly.
“If you look at these generally in line with the four key things they promised to do, they are on track. They either have been initiated or they are deeper into its implementation,” he said.
Professor Kanton identified these four key initiatives as the Nkukor Nkitinkiti programme, the establishment of farm banks, the creation of farmer service centres, and the development of mechanisation centres, describing them as practical steps to support farmers and boost productivity across the sector.
He stressed that sustained implementation of these programmes will be critical to achieving long-term growth and ensuring food security in Ghana.
Agricultural Research Scientist, Professor Roger Kanton, has raised concerns over the sustainability of farming in Ghana, warning that current food prices are too low to support farmers’ livelihoods despite increasing production.
He stressed that while consumers may benefit from affordable food, the prices at which farmers are selling their produce make it difficult for them to cover costs, invest in quality inputs, or earn a fair income.
Currently, food inflation decreased from 9.5% to 6.6% by October 2025. This is a notable improvement from the 22.8% recorded at the same time last year.
Speaking at a Roundtable Discussion organised by Channel One TV on “John Mahama 2.0: A Thematic Assessment of Year One” on Tuesday, January 13, 2026, Prof Kanton highlighted the disparity between market prices for maize and the rising cost of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser.
“When you pick maize, Ghana has the cheapest prices of maize on the global market. When you take Sissala, for example, it produces the best maize for the country. But the price of a bag of maize, which is 100kg, started from about GH¢220 ($20.51). As I speak today, you will be lucky to sell a bag at GH¢280. It is still hovering around GH¢240–GH¢250, which is so bad,” he said.
He contrasted this with the high cost of fertiliser, noting that the best brand, Yara Fertiliser, currently sells for between GH¢500 and GH¢590 per bag.
“This tells you that you may need to sell three bags of maize before you can buy one bag of fertiliser. So it is unfair to sit in Accra and jubilate when the prices are down,” he stressed.
Prof Kanton called for a balance between food production and the livelihood of farmers, advocating for an “optimal price” that ensures food remains affordable for consumers while providing farmers with a sustainable income.
“So, there should be a balance between food production with the livelihood of the farmer in mind, such that there will be an optimal price, such that people can afford the food, and at the same time, the farmer can also get a source of income. So, food prices are too low for the farmers,” he concluded.
The Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana (CAG) has called for urgent establishment of a National Industries Development and Regulatory Authority to prevent the recurrence of failed industrial policies and position Ghana for genuine industrial transformation.
This call was made through a press release issued by the CEO of the Chamber, Mr. Anthony Morrision after the Chamber conducted a comprehensive review of Ghana’s One District One Factory (1D1F) program.
According to CAG, the comprehensive review on 1D1F has revealed that the policy not merely a policy failure, but an economic gaffe that weakened Ghana’s industrial sector rather than strengthening it. A policy that entrenched high-cost production, debt distress, and widespread factory under-utilization instead of promising job creation, enhanced competitiveness, import substitution, and export growth.
KEY FINDINGS AFTER THE REVIEW Prohibitive Capital Costs Undermined Industrial Viability The most damaging flaw of the 1D1F program was the cost of capital. Industrial firms accessed financing at rates ranging from 22% to 47%, including fees, foreign exchange exposure, rollovers, and compounding. These rates are fundamentally incompatible with industrial development, particularly in agro-processing sectors that require five to seven years to stabilize and operate with assets having 15-to-25-year lifespans. At such rates, debt service overwhelms cash flow before economies of scale can be achieved.
By comparison, successful industrializing nations provide manufacturing finance at 3% to 8%. China’s policy banks offer 3% to 5% for strategic industries. Vietnam provides 5% to 7% for export-oriented manufacturing. India’s MUDRA scheme finances MSMEs at 7% to 8%. Rwanda’s development finance operates at 5% to 10% with extended grace periods. Ghana’s 22% to 47% rates make industrial competitiveness mathematically impossible.
Development Finance Institutions Failed Their Mandate Even institutions established to correct market failures priced loans as speculative capital rather than developmental finance. Short moratoriums misaligned with the realities of biological assets, foreign exchange risk was shifted entirely to firms, and no first-loss or risk-sharing mechanisms were implemented. At rates between 22% and 30%, development finance ceased to be developmental. At rates above 40%, it became extractive.
Weakened Fiscal Incentives and Absence of Local Content Policy Rather than offsetting extreme capital costs, government reduced critical fiscal incentives. Rural tax holidays were cut from 10 years to 5 years. Comprehensive exemptions for plant and machinery were not provided. No relief was offered on utilities, spare parts, or industrial inputs. Firms consequently faced a triple burden: high debt service, early tax exposure, and elevated operating costs. This combination locked factories into permanent fragility.
Ghana lacks a robust local content policy framework comparable to successful models elsewhere. Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act reserves specific value chain segments for local firms and mandates progressive local participation.
Malaysia’s Bumiputera policy provided preferential financing, procurement access, and equity requirements that built indigenous industrial capacity. South Korea’s industrial policy in the 1970s through 1990s combined infant industry protection with export discipline, creating globally competitive chaebols. Thailand’s Board of Investment offers three-to-eight-year corporate tax exemptions, machinery duty exemptions, and land ownership rights for strategic industries.
Ghana’s failure to implement competitive incentive packages for indigenous industrial start-ups places local entrepreneurs at a severe disadvantage against imported goods and foreign-owned operations, undermining the very industrialization objectives the nation seeks.
Inadequate Raw Material Systems Factories were commissioned without guaranteed feedstock systems. The absence of compulsory contract farming, production zoning, irrigation planning, and farmer financing frameworks resulted in seasonal and erratic production, low capacity utilization, increased unit costs, and continued dependence on imports.
Employment Outcomes Failed to Materialize Employment under 1D1F was treated as a political outcome rather than an economic function. Under-utilized factories cannot sustain employment. Debt-stressed firms reduce shifts. High interest costs crowd out wages and training investments. The promised jobs remained unstable, temporary, and overstated, while youth
Absence of Skills Development for Sustainable Productivity The 1D1F program failed to integrate skills development and technology transfer frameworks essential for sustainable industrial growth. Germany’s dual vocational training system and Singapore’s SkillsFuture initiative embed workforce development, continuous upskilling, and productivity enhancement as core components of industrial strategy.
Ghana’s approach overlooked technical and vocational training aligned with factory requirements, management capacity building, technology adoption frameworks, quality assurance training, and maintenance skills development. Without these foundational capabilities, factories cannot achieve the productivity levels necessary for competitiveness, regardless of physical infrastructure investments. The result: factories operating below global productivity benchmarks, inability to meet international quality standards, high waste rates, dependence on expatriate technical staff, and limited process improvement. Industrial transformation requires not just factories, but the human capital and institutional capabilities to operate them efficiently.
Operational Complexity and Bureaucratic Barriers The current operational environment poses severe challenges to ease of doing business. Fragmented oversight across multiple agencies, institutions, and ministries creates overlapping and often conflicting mandates. Government’s overbearing ombudsman role and extended bureaucratic processes create significant transaction costs and delays.
Industrial operators face multiple licensing and permit processes across agencies, inconsistent interpretation of regulations, lengthy approval timelines for critical inputs and expansions, duplicative inspections, unclear dispute resolution mechanisms, and ad-hoc policy changes without adequate consultation.
This contrasts with competitive jurisdictions. Rwanda’s single-window business registration completes incorporation in 6 hours. Mauritius offers integrated regulatory clearance through its Economic Development Board. Singapore’s pro-enterprise panel systematically reviews and reduces regulatory burden. Estonia’s e-governance platform enables 99% of public services online with minimal physical interaction.
The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators rank Ghana below regional competitors on starting a business (rank 120), getting electricity (rank 122), and enforcing contracts (rank 116). These structural impediments increase the cost of doing business by an estimated 15% to 30%, eroding any competitive advantage firms might otherwise achieve.
Case Study: Ekumfi Juice Factory The Ekumfi Juice Factory exemplifies the systemic failures of 1D1F. Despite requiring approximately 7,000 acres of cropping support, the facility received only 400 acres. It operated with effectively zero incentives and was financed under short-moratorium, high-cost loan structures. Conservative estimates indicate over $160 million per year in lost production potential and 3,000 to 5,000 foregone jobs due to policy-induced constraints. The factory’s survival came only through absorbing losses, pre-financing farmers, and operating below optimal margins.
Political Expediency Over Economic Sequencing Factories were launched before raw materials were secured, before financing was viable, before infrastructure was ready, and before markets were contracted. Ribbon- cutting ceremonies replaced proper sequencing. Political optics replaced sound balance sheet management.
Contextual Factors Several factors beyond policy design contributed to outcomes and warrant acknowledgment. What the Program Did Achieve The 1D1F program established physical industrial infrastructure in districts that previously had none. It elevated industrialization as a national priority and generated public discourse about manufacturing’s role in economic development. Some factories have achieved operational stability and contribute to local economies. The program demonstrated political will to pursue industrial policy, a necessary precondition for any transformation agenda.
Macroeconomic Constraints on Interest Rates Ghana’s high interest rate environment reflects structural macroeconomic factors that extend beyond industrial policy choices. Persistent inflation, currency volatility, sovereign risk premiums following debt restructuring, and Bank of Ghana monetary policy all contribute to elevated borrowing costs. Financial institutions face genuine risks in lending to nascent industrial ventures, and their pricing reflects real default probabilities, foreign exchange exposure, and liquidity constraints.
This analysis correctly identifies high capital costs as incompatible with industrial development. Addressing this requires broader macroeconomic stabilization, not merely directives to lend at lower rates, which could undermine financial sector stability.
Fiscal Space Limitations The reduction in tax holidays and limited incentive packages occurred within severe fiscal constraints. Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio, IMF program conditionalities, and revenue mobilization pressures limited government’s capacity to offer the generous incentive packages available in comparator countries with stronger fiscal positions. The choice was not simply between generous and limited incentives, but between limited incentives and no program at all.
Implementation Failures Distinct from Policy Design Not all 1D1F shortcomings stem from policy architecture. Implementation challenges included capacity constraints at district and regional levels, coordination failures across government agencies with limited institutional experience in industrial development, private sector partners who underperformed on commitments, and external shocks including COVID-19 disruptions and global supply chain volatility. Firm-level factors such as management quality, market assessment accuracy, and operational discipline also influenced outcomes independent of the policy environment.
Demand-Side Constraints Some factory underperformance reflects market realities beyond policy control. Consumer preferences for imported goods, established distribution networks favoring incumbents, and limited domestic purchasing power constrain demand for locally manufactured products regardless of production costs. Export competitiveness faces challenges from regional competitors with established market positions and preferential trade arrangements.
Impact Assessment These contextual factors notwithstanding, the preponderance of evidence indicates that the 1D1F program made Ghanaian industry less competitive. It raised unit production costs, increased debt burdens, reduced operating capacity, made imports cheaper than locally produced goods, and locked firms into survival mode. This explains why many factories never scaled, never exported, and never created sustainable employment.
Global Evidence: What Works in Industrial Policy Successful industrial transformation follows proven principles that Ghana has consistently ignored. Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) bridges the gap between research and commercialization, providing technical support, prototype development, and technology transfer to SMEs. This produced companies like TSMC. Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA) provides coordinated investment promotion, skills matching, and regulatory facilitation, attracting over 300 billion euros in FDI while developing indigenous supply chains. Ethiopia’s Industrial Parks Development Corporation offers plug-and-play facilities with pre-cleared utilities, streamlined customs, and coordinated services, achieving 60% to 80% capacity utilization within two to three years of operation.
These models demonstrate that industrial success requires dedicated institutional architecture with technical competence, regulatory authority, and coordinated implementation capacity. Ghana currently lacks this.
The Economic and Strategic Imperative Ghana faces mounting economic pressures: a manufacturing sector contributing only 12% to GDP, youth unemployment exceeding 25%, import dependency draining foreign reserves, and debt distress limiting fiscal space for industrial support. Without urgent industrial transformation, Ghana risks permanent deindustrialization as regional competitors advance.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) presents both opportunity and threat. Countries with competitive manufacturing will capture regional markets. Those without will become permanent importers. Ghana’s current policy trajectory positions the nation as a consumer market rather than a production hub.
Conclusion and Recommendation Industrialization cannot succeed when financed at rates between 22% and 47%, burdened by bureaucratic complexity, and unsupported by skills development and local content frameworks. The 1D1F program failed because capital was priced like speculation, incentives were diluted, value chains were ignored, productivity capabilities were overlooked, and political considerations overrode economic logic. Factories alone do not create competitiveness. Affordable capital, secure inputs, streamlined regulations, skilled workforces, and patient, evidence-based policy do.
The Chamber of Agribusiness calls for the immediate establishment of a National Industries Development and Regulatory Authority with the mandate to: Ensure industrial financing aligns with international development finance standards (3% to 10% for strategic sectors with appropriate grace periods). Coordinate raw material value chains before factory commissioning, including contract farming, production zoning, and input supply systems. Implement comprehensive local content policies and competitive incentive frameworks that prioritize indigenous industrial start-ups Develop skills programs aligned with industry needs for sustainable productivity. Streamline regulatory processes across agencies through single-window clearance systems. Enforce proper sequencing and feasibility assessment based on economic viability rather than political timelines. Provide independent regulatory oversight with technical competence and autonomy from political interference. Establish productivity and quality standards benchmarked against international best practices. Create technology transfer and innovation support mechanisms Monitor and report publicly on industrial performance indicators
On the Risk of Adding Another Agency There is an obvious tension between criticizing fragmented oversight and proposing a new authority. We address this directly. The proposed Authority is not an additional layer. It is a consolidating body that absorbs, coordinates, or supersedes overlapping mandates currently scattered across ministries and agencies. The Authority should inherit industrial policy functions now fragmented across the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, Ghana Free Zones Authority, and relevant divisions of the Ministry of Finance.
The enabling legislation must include sunset provisions for redundant functions in existing agencies, clear jurisdictional boundaries to prevent mandate creep, inter- agency protocols that subordinate other bodies to Authority decisions on industrial matters, and performance metrics tied to reduced compliance burden rather than expanded oversight.
The Authority’s success should be measured by the reduction in total regulatory touchpoints firms must navigate. If implemented correctly, it should result in fewer agencies with industrial mandates, not more. The Chamber commits to opposing any implementation that merely adds bureaucratic layers without rationalization.
This Authority must operate with statutory independence, technical expertise, and coordinated mandates across the industrial value chain, from finance and inputs through production, skills development, regulatory compliance, and market access.
Unless Ghana abandons optics-driven industrial programs and returns to serious industrial economics grounded in global best practices, future initiatives will reproduce the same failures regardless of branding. The establishment of a National Industries Development and Regulatory Authority is not administrative reform. It is an economic and strategic imperative for Ghana’s transformation.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat concluded two days of Joint Agriculture and Trade Stakeholders Consultations in Addis Ababa, with participants validating a comprehensive Agri-Food Trade Action Plan designed to transform Africa’s agricultural sector into a driver of continental integration and economic growth.
The consultations brought together senior technical officials from Ministries of Trade and Agriculture across AfCFTA State Parties, Regional Economic Communities, private sector representatives, and development partners to finalise a framework that bridges the gap between agricultural production and market access across the continent.
Opening the meeting, Wamkele Mene, Secretary-General of the AfCFTA Secretariat, emphasised that a competitive and resilient agricultural sector is essential to realising the AfCFTA’s objectives. “This revised Agri-Food Trade Action Plan is not an abstract framework, but a practical tool designed to connect Africa’s production potential with Africa’s markets,” he stated.
The Secretary-General outlined how the Plan identifies strategic value chains where Africa holds clear comparative advantages and details the reforms needed to unlock them, including reducing non-tariff barriers, harmonising standards, improving border efficiency, and investing in trade-related infrastructure. He stressed that effective implementation of the Agri-Food Trade Plan requires close coordination between ministries responsible for trade and agriculture, working alongside Regional Economic Communities and the private sector.
The Secretary-General highlighted the need to leverage digital trade tools including the AfCFTA e-Tariff Book, e-Certificate of Origin, and the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System to facilitate agricultural trade across borders.
Dr. Janet Edeme, Head of Agriculture and Rural Development at the African Union Commission’s Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment, underscored the importance of the joint consultation approach. “By assembling representatives from both sectors, we foster a unified approach, thereby enhancing the coherence required for effective implementation,” she noted, highlighting the growing recognition of agriculture and trade interdependence.
Dr. Alexis Kabayiza, Chief Technical Advisor in the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Rwanda, emphasised that collaboration between agriculture and trade communities at national, regional, and continental levels is essential. He stressed that shared success depends on coordinated actions guided by private-sector realities and data-driven solutions, reaffirming Rwanda’s commitment to working with all African Member States to translate the Action Plan into tangible gains for farmers, SMEs, processors, and consumers.
Participants aligned on five priority areas to advance agricultural trade under the AfCFTA. These include enhancing coordination between agriculture and trade policy areas, expanding strategic agri-food value chains with particular focus on cotton and cashew, mobilising sustainable financing to unlock investment and scale production, improving market access and predictability for farmers and small enterprises, and strengthening monitoring and accountability for delivery.
The Action Plan provides a practical pathway to connect production to market, retain value within the continent, and drive new opportunities across the agricultural economy, addressing a critical gap in Africa’s economic transformation.
The consultations also tackled Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which remain critical to achieving continental commitments under the African Union Agenda 2063. Despite the adoption of the AU Sanitary and Phytosanitary Policy Framework, implementation across Africa remains limited due to low awareness at national and regional levels, impeding effective domestication and resulting in foodborne diseases, pest invasions, reduced productivity, and market access losses.
The validation of the Agri-Food Trade Action Plan represents a collaborative effort between the AfCFTA Secretariat, AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa), and UK International Development. This partnership aims to strengthen cross-sectoral coordination by engaging focal points from Ministries of Agriculture and Trade, building joint ownership and deepening integration of the Plan at national and regional levels.
After months of parched taps and escalating public frustration, the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) has offered a glimmer of hope to the residents of Teshie and its environs.
The company says it is working “around the clock” to restore the Teshie-Nungua Desalination Plant by the end of January 2026, potentially ending a crisis that has forced thousands to rely on expensive private vendors.
Speaking on JoyFM’s Newsnight on Monday evening, January 12, the Communications Director of GWCL, Stanley Martey, broke the company’s silence on the legal and technical “impasse” that has kept the $126 million plant offline since October 2025.
For the nearly 500,000 residents across Teshie, Nungua, Baatsona, Spintex, and Sakumono, water scarcity has become a grim daily reality.
While some areas previously enjoyed near-constant flow, Mr Martey admitted that for most, the service was already fragile long before the current collapse.
“Until October, every area was receiving [water] an average of four days in a week. Rationing has been ongoing for a very long time. We don’t dispute that. But then a few people were getting 24/7 but the rest of us were getting an average of four days in a week,” Mr Martey explained.
The shutdown of the desalination plant, which converts seawater into potable drinking water, has gutted the volumes available to the coastal belt.
Mr Martey revealed that high-level government intervention is now the driving force behind the optimistic January 2026 deadline.
The crisis has recently escalated into a public health concern, with clinics in Teshie reporting an uptick in water-borne infection risks.
Addressing these fears, the GWCL spokesperson appealed for patience, arguing that the delay is necessary to ensure the plant provides safe water for the long term.
“Let me also state that, as we apologize to the people, we want the people to appreciate the fact that everything we are doing is in the interest of the people, because we need good quality drinking water for them, and we need the plant also in a certain condition where we can use it for a very long time. And that is the category issues that we all must appreciate,” Mr Martey concluded.
Recent global headlines regarding infant nutrition have caused understandable anxiety for parents across Ghana.
It follows a voluntary and precautionary recall of several batches of Nestlé baby formula due to potential health risks. Although Nestlé Ghana has stated that products sold through official channels are safe, the presence of unregulated trade routes means that parents must stay incredibly alert.
This explainer highlights why the grey market of unofficial imports poses a real threat to your child’s health and what you can do to stay safe.
Why the recall? What’s the danger?
The international recall was triggered by concerns over contamination with cereulide, a toxin produced by the bacteria Bacillus cereus. If an infant consumes formula containing this toxin, they may suffer from food poisoning, with the most common symptoms being nausea and vomiting.
The recall is wide-reaching, affecting specific batches of SMA, NAN, BEBA, and Alfamino products in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and parts of Africa.
In a neighboring example, the South African consumer commission recently pulled a specific batch of NAN Special Pro HA from its shelves due to these same toxin concerns.
Ghana’s Porous Border Problem
Nestlé Ghana and the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) have been quick to reassure the public that officially registered products specifically SMA Gold 1–3 and NAN Optipro 1–3 are not part of the affected batches and remain safe for your baby.
However, these assurances only cover the official supply chain. Ghana is known for its porous borders and a high volume of informal or unregulated trade. Even if the formula in the local supermarket is safe, these unofficially imported batches could slip through the gaps in our trade borders.
The Chamber of Cannabis Industry Ghana has called for a careful and coordinated implementation of Ghana’s medicinal and industrial cannabis policy in 2026 to maximise economic benefits while safeguarding the public interest.
Dr Mark Darko, Chief Executive Officer of the Chamber, said the new year should mark a shift from policy aspiration to execution, following the legalisation of cannabis for medicinal and industrial use.
“This is a year that calls not for speculation, but for clarity of purpose, institutional readiness and strategic patience,” he said in a New Year message to stakeholders across the emerging industry.
Dr Darko noted that while stakeholders were awaiting the finalisation of fees, charges and operational guidelines, foundational work in the sector had continued.
He cited progress in standard-setting, capacity development, and intensified local and international engagement.
“These are the often unseen but essential building blocks of a credible and sustainable industry,” he said.
Dr Darko said a properly regulated cannabis industry could support pharmaceutical development, supply industrial raw materials, generate export earnings and create skilled employment opportunities, particularly for the youth and women.
He urged entrepreneurs, investors, farmers and researchers to prioritise compliance, training and alignment with global best practices rather than pursue short-term gains.
“The jurisdictions that succeed in cannabis are those that build deliberately, guided by data, standards and long-term national interest,” he said.
Dr Darko reaffirmed the Chamber’s commitment to advocacy, capacity building and stakeholder coordination.
He said that collaboration among government, regulators, industry players and civil society would position Ghana as a responsible participant in the global cannabis value chain.
Ghana amended its narcotics laws in 2020 to permit the cultivation of cannabis with low tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content for medicinal and industrial purposes.
The Chamber has consistently maintained that cannabis-based innovations could support Ghana’s broader economic transformation if implemented within a strong regulatory framework.
